Moderators:
Curtis Milhaupt
Stanford Law School and ECGI
Wolf-Georg Ringe
University of Hamburg and ECGI
Panelists:
Thom Abbott
Head of SE Asia, London Stock Exchange
Sharon Lau
Partner, Latham & Watkins
Kazuhiko Yoshimatsu
Managing Director of
Singapore, Head of APAC, Tokyo Stock Exchange, Singapore
Chin-Yee Chew
Managing Director, SGX RegCo
Abstract
Paper authors: Curtis Milhaupt and Wolf-Georg Ringe
Conventional academic and media accounts depict global stock exchange competition as a contest of regulatory standards to win initial public offerings (IPOs). This Article re-examines global stock exchange competition through a much broader political economy lens. We make two central arguments. First, competition for IPOs, while highly visible, is subject to important qualifications: IPOs provide only marginal revenues for modern exchanges, most firms are unable to engage in regulatory arbitrage to obtain a high-profile foreign listing, and the public markets are increasingly eclipsed by private capital as a rival source of finance. Second, while the role of nation states has been largely ignored in the literature on stock exchange competition, they have keen economic, policy and geopolitical interests in their domestic exchanges. By moving beyond the “race to the bottom” framework and a narrow focus on IPOs, we show how stock exchanges have become strategic assets in a new era of global competition, calling for sustained scholarly engagement across law, economics, and international relations.
